

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 01774 191808Z

40-45

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 ACDE-00

/031 W

----- 013345

P 191430Z MAR 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2277

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SALT TWO GENEVA 1774

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E. O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 19, 1974

(SALT TWO -417)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON AT
THE SALT TWO MEETING OF MARCH 19, 1974.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

MARCH 19, 1974

MR. MINISTER:

I

TODAY I WISH TO SPEAK ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF REDUCTIONS OF
THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 01774 191808Z

THIS SUBJECT IS PART OF THE NEGOTIATING TASK ASSIGNED TO

OUR TWO DELEGATIONS. THE AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, SIGNED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL ON JUNE 21, 1973, PROVIDES, "THE TWO SIDES WILL CONTINUE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO WORK OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS WELL AS THEIR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION...."

II

THE PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES IN DEVELOPING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS TO MAKE THE INITIATION OF HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OR ITS ALLIES AN UNACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR ANY COUNTRY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS A SIMILAR ATTITUDE ABOUT ITS SECURITY INTERESTS.

DURING THE COURSE OF THE NUCLEAR ERA, EACH OF OUR GOVERNMENTS HAS PERCEIVED THE NEED TO INCREASE ITS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN ORDER TO ENHANCE ITS OWN SECURITY INTERESTS. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES HAS SHAPED THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THIS RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN, AND CAN CONTINUE TO BE, A DYNAMIC ONE. IT IS DYNAMIC IN CHARACTER BECAUSE IT IS STILL SUBJECT TO CHANGE: THE CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES BY ONE SIDE, UNLESS COUNTERED BY THE OTHER SIDE, COULD UPSET THE BALANCE.

BOTH OF OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A BALANCED STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE AGREEMENT OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, SIGNED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL ON MAY 29, 1972, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT EFFORTS BY ONE SIDE TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER SIDE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE INADMISSIBILITY OF EITHER SIDE SEEKING A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE WAS CONFIRMED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN JUNE 1973 IN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDE US, OUR TASK IS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 01774 191808Z

TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PRESERVE AND ENHANCE THE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IF WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WOULD BE ENHANCED, CREATING A SITUATION WHICH WOULD FURTHER REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. IF WE CANNOT REACH AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE EQUILIBRIUM IN OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP CAN BE PRESERVED ONLY BY SUCCESSIVE UNILATERAL

ACTIONS. IF ONE SIDE SHOULD TAKE ACTION THAT THE OTHER SIDE PERCEIVES AS UPSETTING THE BALANCE, THEN IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE EQUILIBRIUM THE OTHER SIDE IS LIKELY TO UNDERTAKE A COUNTER-BALANCING ACTION.

III

IN VIEW OF THE CURENT LEVELS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ON EACH SIDE, IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER A CONTINUED INCREASE IN THE NUMBERS OF THESE ARMS WOULD PRODUCE A CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN THE PERCEIVED SECURITY OF EITHER COUNTRY. THEREFORE, THE PREFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO BALANCE THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES BY LIMITATIONS THROUGH AGREEMENT. ACCORDINGLY, THE UNITED STATES HAS SET FORTH CONCEPTS TO GUIDE US IN REACHING AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT.

THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED AN EQUAL LIMIT OF 2350 ON THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS POSSESSED BY EACH SIDE; AN EQUAL LIMIT ON THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS WITH MIRVS POSSESSED BY EACH SIDE; AND A SUBSTANTIALLY EQUAL AGGREGATE POTENTIAL OF THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AS REPRESENTED BY THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS, THE THROW-WEIGHT OF SLBMS, AND AN ALLOWANCE FOR THE HEAVY BOMBER FLEETS OF THE TWO SIDES. WE HAVE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING MIRVS ON ICBMS PROMPTLY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE SURVIVABILITY OF DETERRENT FORCES, ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY, AND REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. WE HAVE NOTED THAT, PROVIDED THE SOVIET SIDE WILL AGREE TO LIMIT ICBM MIRV THROW-WEIGHT TO EQUAL AGGREGATE LEVELS, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPA
E E E E E E E

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SPEECHES, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 MAR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974SALTT01774
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740332/aaaabdzdb.tel
Line Count: 139
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 19 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 APR 2002 by garlanwa>; APPROVED <31 JAN 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 19, 1974 (SALT TWO -417)
TAGS: PARM, (JOHNSON)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005